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I. INTRODUCTION

This Essay explores the subterranean Fourth Amendment-the belowthe-surface motifs of current rules regulating searches and seizures by the
police. The three themes it identifies-having to do with alienage, race, and
poverty-vary in their proximity to the surface and their pervasiveness. But
they all taint the ground rules that purportedly govern police investigations.
The idea for this Essay was triggered by Professor Alfredo Mirandd's
work "Is There a Mexican Exception to the Fourth Amendment?" published
in this special issue of Florida Law Review.' The thesis of Professor
Mirandd's essay is that the effect, if not the intent, of Fourth Amendment
caselaw has been to accord Mexicans less protection than non-Mexicans.
This "exception," Professor Mirandd asserts, exists independently of the
courts' more explicit exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
stipulations of the Fourth Amendment.2

* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College
of Law. I would like to thank Berta Hemandez, Craig Bradley, and Kevin Johnson for their
comments on this Essay.
1. Alfredo Mirandd, Is There a Mexican Exception to the Fourth Amendment?, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 365 (2003).
2. See id
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My original reason for agreeing to write this Essay was that I have
difficulty accepting this assessment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
After looking closely at the cases Professor Mirand6 cites, I am willing to
accept that illegalaliens are unfairly treated under the Fourth Amendment.
But I see little evidence of a Mexican exception to the Fourth Amendment.
With one anomaly, the cases Professor Mirandd relies upon to support the
latter proposition all seem consistent with other caselaw that has nothing
to do with people from countries south of our border.
That was to have been the gist ofmy response. But Professor Mirand6's
essay eventually led me to consider the possibility of other "unofficial"
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment based on suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications. I ended up concluding that, in addition to the illegal alien
rule, there is at least one other unrecognized and illegitimate exception to
the Fourth Amendment-a "poverty exception." More specifically, this
Essay argues that there are a number of cases, even if one looks solely at
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, that sound neutral with respect to class
and economic circumstance, but in fact seriously undermine the Fourth
Amendment as applied to poorer people.
As a way of introducing that thesis, I first briefly examine the evidence
in Supreme Court caselaw for an illegal alien exception,3 which Ithink does
exist, and for Professor Mirandd's Mexican exception,4 which is much
harder to find in the Court's cases. I then make the case for the poverty
exception,5 which is not as conspicuous as the first exception, but much
more concrete than the second. The Essay ends with a brief critique of
Professor William Stuntz' thought-provoking but ultimately troublesome
thesis about the relationship between poverty and the Fourth Amendment.'
II. THE ILLEGAL ALIEN EXCEPTION: EXPLICIT AND DUBIOUS
The case for an illegal alien "exception" to the Fourth Amendment
comes from two Supreme Court decisions, the first dealing with the scope
of the exclusionary rule,7 the second with the definition of the word
"people" in the Fourth Amendment.' On the surface, the first case seems to
be primarily another manifestation ofthe Supreme Court's hostility toward
exclusion as a Fourth Amendment remedy, and only secondarily about
illegal aliens, and the second decision does not appear to be about illegal
aliens at all. But a closer inspection of these two cases reveals that the

3. See infra Part 11.
4. See infra Part 11I.
5. See infra Part IV.

6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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Court is willing to distort basic Fourth Amendment principles to ensure the
latter group is excluded from the amendment's protections.
Suppression of illegally seized evidence has been the principal method
of sanctioning Fourth Amendment violations since Mapp v. Ohio.9 In the
past three decades, however, the Supreme Court has created a host of
exceptions to the exclusionary rule's application. Virtually all of these
exceptions are grounded on one of two theories of deterrence, the good
faith theory or the secondary process theory.
The good faith theory justifies foregoing exclusion when officers
conduct an illegal search or seizure relying on a facially valid warrant,'0 a
statute," or a computerized arrest report."2 In all of these situations, one
can make a plausible claim that the threat of exclusion does not act as a
deterrent. Police officers who believe they are operating with a valid
warrant or under a duly enacted statute, the theory goes, are not likely to
believe their actions violate the Fourth Amendment.
The secondary process theory rejects application of the exclusionary
remedy in connection with proceedings--such as grand jury 3 and
sentencing hearings 4-- or procedures-such as impeachment of the
defendant' 5-that are ancillary to making the prosecution's prima facie
case. The reasoning here is that exclusion is not necessary in such situations
because sufficient deterrence is achieved through preventing use of illegal
evidence in the government's case-in-chief, the supposed focus of all law
enforcement efforts.' 6 The secondary process theory also can be used to
justify the introduction of illegally obtained evidence in noncriminal
adjudications, such as tax deficiency proceedings, at least when the

9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984) (holding that exclusion is not required

when police rely in objective good faith on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate
that is later determined to be invalid); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984)
(holding same).
11. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (holding that exclusion is not required
when police conduct a search authorized by a statute subsequently found unconstitutional);
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 41 (1979) (holding same).
12. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) (holding that exclusion is not required when

police reasonably rely on a computerized arrest record that turns out to be inaccurate).
13. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974) (holding that illegally seized
evidence may be considered by the grand jury).
14. Although the Supreme Court has yet to so hold, lower courts routinely conclude that the
rule is inapplicable at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
15. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (holding that illegally seized
evidence may be used to impeach a defendant if cross-examination questions stay within the scope
of direct examination).
16. Cf Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351 ("Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best.").
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evidence is obtained by police who are looking for evidence of crime,"7
because again the specter of exclusion at the criminal trial is seen as
sufficient deterrence.
An exception to this theoretical framework for deciding when exclusion
is warranted occurs when illegal aliens are involved, however. In INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza,"8 the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does
not apply in civil deportation proceedings, even when the officials who
conduct the illegal action are not police officers bent on obtaining evidence
for a criminal trial, but rather INS officials looking for evidence suitable to
support deportation. 9 The Court's justifications for this holding were
several: (1) the INS' own administrative sanctions already provide some
deterrence20 (even though those sanctions had never been imposed on an
INS official!2 ); (2) applying the rule in this setting would be
administratively inconvenient, given the high number of civil deportation
proceedings;22 and (3) somewhat inconsistently with the second
justification, INS officers know Fourth Amendment challenges to
deportation actions are rare and so are unlikely to be deterred by
exclusion.23
None of these reasons even remotely suggest that violations of the
Fourth Amendment by INS officials are likely to be the result of honest
mistake. Nor do they indicate that INS officials who are thinking about
violating the Fourth Amendment will be concerned about exclusion in a
parallel criminal proceeding (indeed, criminal deportation proceedings are
exceedingly rare24). In other words, Lopez-Mendoza allowed the
introduction of illegally seized evidence even though neither the good faith
nor secondary proceeding rationales apply. As a result of that case, INS

17. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454 (1976) (holding that illegally seized evidence
may be used at a tax deficiency proceeding when seizure is by a police officer).
18. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
19. Id. at 1051.
20. Id. at 1045 ("[Tihe deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings
is undermined by the availability of alternative remedies for institutional practices by the INS that
might violate Fourth Amendment rights.").
21. Id. at 1054-55 & n.2 (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the INS could point to no
instances where disciplinary proceedings were brought against officers for violation of search and
seizure rules).
22. Id. at 1048-49 ("The ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time spent on
[exclusionary rule] cases at all levels has an adverse impact on the effective administration of the

immigration laws.").
23. Id. at 1044 (reasoning that because so few exclusions occur in criminal deportation
proceedings, "[e]very INS agent knows... that it is highly unlikely that any particular arrestee
will end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal deportation proceeding").
24. Id.at 1042-43 ("[I]t must be acknowledged that only a very small percentage of arrests

of aliens are intended or expected to lead to criminal prosecutions.").
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officials whose sole goal is acquiring evidence to deport may knowingly
violate the Fourth Amendment without fear of exclusion in any proceeding.
Because it departs from the Supreme Court's normal explanations for
rejecting the exclusionary remedy, Lopez-Mendoza evidences particular
hostility toward search and seizure claims that are raised by illegal aliens.
But at least the case assumes that illegal aliens have Fourth Amendment
rights (albeit rights that will not be vindicated through exclusion in the
deportation context). That assumption may no longer be accurate. Six years
after Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez," which may have rendered the former case irrelevant.
Normally, the Fourth Amendment requires that police obtain a warrant,
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, before making a non-exigent
search of a home. In Verdugo-Urquidez, however, the Court upheld
warrantless non-exigent searches of two residences because they were on
foreign soil and owned by someone with an insufficient connection to the
United States.26 According to the Court, a person who is not a U.S. citizen
and has no "voluntary attachment" to the United States, but rather, like
Verdugo-Urquidez, is connected to this country only because he was
brought here under arrest, is not one of the "people" protected by the
amendment. 7 In such a situation, neither the person nor his or her property
is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, even against actions
conducted, as they were here, by American police.
Although Verdugo-Urquidez was not himself an illegal alien (because
his presence in the country was the result of conduct by U.S. authorities), 8
the language used to describe why the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
protect him could very easily refer to someone from that group as well;
[t]he Fourth Amendment, the Court stated, only enures to the benefit of
"persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of
that community."29 Certainly many illegal aliens, especially those who have
just crossed the border, would have a hard time showing they have
developed a "sufficient connection" to the United States. Indeed, the Court
admitted in Verdugo-Urquidezthat "[olur statements in Lopez-Mendoza
are . . . not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a Fourth

Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim were

25. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).

26. Id. at 265 (stating that the "people" in the Fourth Amendment "refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community").
27. Id. at 274-75.
28. Id. at 262.
29. Id. at 265.
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squarely before us,"3 and lower courts have not been hesitant to apply
Verdugo-Urquidezto the latter group.3"
If that means that illegal aliens have no Fourth Amendment rights,
consider the implications. Of all the people in the United States, including
violent criminals, only those who lack proper documentation can be
searched and seized withoutjustification. The message this treatment sends
is that illegal aliens are not "people"--literally, not just as a constitutional
matter. Rather than human beings with autonomy and privacy interests,
illegal aliens, like illegal drugs and illegal weapons, are contraband that can
be seized and inspected as the government sees fit.
The practical consequence, if not the intent, of Lopez-Mendoza and
Verdugo- Urquidez is the creation of an illegal alien exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Because that exception unfairly singles out illegal aliens,3" it
should be eliminated.33
III. THE MEXICAN EXCEPTION: IMPLICIT AND BARELY DISCERNIBLE
To be distinguished from the illegal alien exception is Professor
Mirandd's Mexican exception to the Fourth Amendment.34 In addition to
Lopez-Mendoza and Verdugo-Urquidez,which I think better illustrate the
first exception (since they apply to any illegal alien, not just Mexicans or
Latinos/as), Professor Mirandd's essay mentions several other Supreme
Court cases in support of his argument that a Mexican exception exists. All

30. Id. at 272.
31. James G. Connell, III & Rene L. Valladares, Search and Seizure Protections for
Undocumented Aliens: The Territoriality and Voluntary Presence Principles in Fourth
Amendment Law, 34 Am.CRIM. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1997) ("[C]ourts have cited VerdugoUrquidez for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not automatically protect
undocumented aliens even if the challenged search and seizure took place inthis country.").
32. The claim of unfairness is subject to a caveat. Lopez-Mendoza may not be the only case
in which the Court has departed from the good faith and secondary process rationales for avoiding
exclusion. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation &Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings even when the illegal searches were
conducted by parole officers interested primarily in garnering evidence for revocation
proceedings). And Verdugo-Urquidez might eventually be limited to its facts (which involved
searches on foreign soil and a person with no voluntary attachment to the United States), or by the
suggestion of two of the six Justices inthe majority that had there been away to comply with U.S.
law in Mexico a different outcome might have resulted. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 278
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). But criminal proceedings using
evidence found by parole officers are much more likely than criminal deportation proceedings
using evidence found by INS officials. See supra note 23. And Verdugo-Urquidez is as likely to
be given an expansive reading as a narrow one. See supra note 31.
33. For a similar conclusion, see Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth
Amendment? Undocumented Immigrants'Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S.CAL. L. REv. 999 (1992).
34. See generally Mirand, supra note I.
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but one, however, are consistent with caselaw that applies to people of all
nationalities.
Most of the cases cited by Professor Mirandd are part of the Court's socalled "border" jurisprudence. It is true that the Fourth Amendment's
protections are significantly relaxed for searches and seizures conducted at
the border or its functional equivalent.35 But again, this law, or lack thereof,
governs at all borders, north and south. In its other cases involving searches
and seizures near the border, the Court has closely adhered to its
universally-applied Fourth Amendment caselaw. Although decisions like
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 6 and United States v. Ortiz,37 which
Professor Mirand6 considers strong proof of a Mexican exception,
permitted warrantless searches of cars stopped near the border, they were
merely routine applications of the Court's long-standing vehicle search
exception jurisprudence allowing such searches when there is probable
cause. 38 Indeed, they both rejected the government's argument that this
exception should be broadened even further in the immigration context.39
In the same vein is UnitedStates v. Brignoni-Ponce,° which made clear

that the fact that a car is stopped near the border does not eliminate the
reasonable suspicion requirement for brief investigative detentions.4 ,
I have more trouble with two other "border" cases mentioned by
Professor Mirandd, but primarily because I have problems with the
generally applicable Fourth Amendment law on which they are based rather
than because I share Professor Mirandd's concerns about anti-Mexican bias.
INS v. Delgado42 held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when
armed INS officials briefly questioned factory workers to determine their
citizenship status,43 but that dubious decision is entirely consistent with the
Court's similarly dubious line of cases holding that brief questioning of
35. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ("Routine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants [at the border] are not subject to any requirement
of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.").
36. 413 U.S. 266(1973).
37. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
38. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925) (holding that police may
conduct a warrantless search of a readily mobile automobile when they have probable cause). This
rule has been dubbed the "automobile exception." See CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS ch. 7 (4th ed. 2000).
39. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270 ("[T]he Government... understandably sidesteps
the automobile search cases [and] relies heavily on cases dealing with administrative inspections.
But these cases fail to support the constitutionality of this search."); Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896 ("We
are not persuaded that the differences between roving patrols and traffic checkpoints justify
dispensing in this case with the safeguards we required inAlmeida-Sanchez.").
40. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
41. Id. at 882.
42. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
43. Id. at218.
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anyone is generally not a seizure." And although United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,5 dealing with illegal immigrant checkpoints in Southern
California, was the first decision in which the Court permitted seizures at
roadblocks despite the absence of any individualized suspicion," it certainly
was not the last."' Like the first three border decisions mentioned,48 these
two opinions are merely applications of established Fourth Amendment law,
however questionable, to cases that happened to involve Mexicans.
The one caveat I would make to that conclusion is that in two of these
five cases, Brignoni-Ponceand Martinez-Fuerte,the Court specifically

stated that Mexican ancestry could be used to justify the seizures that took
place.49 In no other case has the Court explicitly stated that race or ethnicity
may be a factor justifying a search or seizure, and in fact it has suggested
that reliance on race is generally not permissible for such a purpose.5° While
I think there is a plausible justification for such reliance, that justification
can only be carried so far.
The plausible justification is the border setting at issue in these cases.
Just as police may focus on people of a certain race when investigating a
crime known or suspected to have been committed by a person of that race,
it is not unreasonable to permit officials looking for illegal aliens near
Mexico to consider Mexican heritage as one of the relevant factors. It is
true that not every illegal alien in that area will be Mexican. But because of
the reality of our southern border, undocumented entrants are very likely
to be Mexican nationals, and the Fourth Amendment has never required
certainty, but rather only an "articulable" probability that evidence of
criminal activity will be discovered through their investigative actions."
That reasoning at most justifies the holding in Brignoni-Ponce,
however. There the Court stated that "Mexican appearance" is "a relevant
factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican44. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,437 (1991) (holding that police questioning
of a passenger on a bus is not a seizure).
45. 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
46. Id.

47. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1999) (upholding
suspicionless stops at sobriety checkpoints); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)
(suggesting that suspicionless stops at license checkpoints are permissible).
48. See supra notes 36-40.
49. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) ("[T]he likelihood that

any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor. . . ."); Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 563 ("[E]ven if it be assumed that such
referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional
violation.").
50. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court indicated that proof that a
search or seizure was the product of intentional racial discrimination would provide a basis for
relief under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 813.
51. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21(1968).
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Americans to ask if they are aliens."52 In Martinez-Fuerte,in contrast, the
Court held that a referral from the initial checkpoint to a "secondary
referral" point, where prolonged questioning and document checks
occurred, could be based "largely" and perhaps solely on Mexican
ancestry.5" As I have written elsewhere,54 even if race is relevant to the
suspicion inquiry (and I think it is in this context), we should not
countenance its use if doing so sends a message that government actions
may be based largely or solely on the color of a person's skin or his or her

ethnicity.55 Otherwise, those who are seized are being told that they become
criminal suspects merely by looking the way they do, and the rest of society
is sent the abhorrent message
5 that discriminatory actions based on race and
permissible.
are
ethnicity
Martinez-Fuerte,then, does seem to advance a "Mexican exception" to
the Fourth Amendment, and it is one that should not exist. But it appears
to be the only plain example of such an exception in the Supreme Court's
cases.
IV. THE POVERTY EXCEPTION: IMPLICIT BUT REAL

Even if a "Mexican exception" to the Fourth Amendment is hard to
parse from the cases, that phrase, and the illegal alien cases, raise an
52. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87. The Court noted that, in addition to appearance,
police searching for illegal immigrants in vehicles might look at the characteristics of the area
where the vehicle is found and its proximity to the border, information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area, the driver's behavior, and aspects of the vehicle itself. Id. at 884-85.
53. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 563.
54. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. I
(1991).
55. See id. at 84-86.
56. It is possible that this argument might also require reversal of Brignoni-Ponce "as
applied." While that decision is justifiable on its face, Professor Johnson has noted that its
application has lead to very disturbing police actions. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against
Race Profiling in ImmigrationEnforcement, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 675, 697-716 (2000) (detailing
cases where police stopped Mexican-Americans apparently solely or largely because of their
appearance, and describing the resulting dignitary harms). Professor Mirand6 makes the same
point. See generally Miranda, supra note 1. If courts are relying on Brignoni-Ponceas authority
for using Latino/a heritage as the main criterion for immigration-related stops in the Southwest
then, as I argue in the text, it is bad law, however justifiable in theory.
However, it is worth noting that, in three of the four cases Professor Mirandd cites as evidence
of racial profiling, the Ninth Circuit found the Fourth Amendment was violated. Id. at 367-76. See
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that it was unreasonable to stop
two men of Mexican-American ancestry who looked at police and then looked away and one of
whom was wearing a cap); United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
it was unreasonable to stof, person of Mexican ancestry driving an old car that appeared loaded
down); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that it was
unreasonable to stop six "Mexican-American appearing males" riding in a sedan at dusk who were
sitting erectly and not looking at a passing patrol car).
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interesting query. Are there other examples in Supreme Court caselaw that

demonstrate inequitable application, conscious or not, of the Fourth
Amendment to a particular group? For instance, is there an "AfricanAmerican exception" to the Fourth Amendment," or a "drug user
exception"?" Below I make the case for what I think may be the best

"hidden" example of anti-egalitarianism in Fourth Amendment law-an
exception based on poverty (which may, given the overlap between class
and race, come close to being a "minority exception" as well, but is not the

same thing). The discussion focuses on the Supreme Court's caselaw, first
in connection with searches, and then in connection with seizures.
A. SearchJurisprudence
Much of the evidence for the "poverty exception" to the Fourth
Amendment comes from the Supreme Court cases that define the threshold
of that amendment. These cases tell us when we have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy," police infringement of which is a "search" that
triggers the Fourth Amendment's protection.59 If the police engage in a
search, so defined, then they usually need probable cause and often need a
warrant. If their action is not a search, they need neither a warrant, or any
justification for their action.
Several Court decisions define expectations of privacy in a way that
makes people who are less well-off more likely to experience warrantless,
suspicionless government intrusions. For instance, the Court has stressed
that the Fourth Amendment is less likely to be implicated when a reasonable
person would have taken more steps to ensure the privacy of the area
searched.' Similarly, it has indicated that the amendment is not applicable
when the vantage point used by the police to spy or eavesdrop on people
in their homes and other locations is "lawful," that is, public or quasipublic.6 ' Instead of declaring that one's living space and belongings are
57. See infra note 93.

58. As several commentators have pointed out, many of the exceptions to the traditional
warrant and probable cause requirements have come from cases involving drug dealers and users
and possessors of drugs. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim ofIllegal Narcotics: The
Fourth Amendment (as Demonstrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PrIT. L. REV. 1 (1986).
59. See generally WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 38, § 4.03.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (holding that search of barn
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment in part because target had only covered opening into the
barn with see-through netting); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 213-14 (1986) (holding
that a police flyover of a backyard does not implicate the Fourth Amendment in part because
anyone flying over the property or on a large vehicle could have seen over target's fence);
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (holding that "legitimate expectations of privacy"

may exist only when the search target has taken precautions that are customarily taken by those
seeking privacy).
61. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304-05 (holding that viewing a barn from private "open fields" is not
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automatically entitled to constitutional protection-a conclusion that would
seem to follow from the Fourth Amendment's explicit mention of"houses"
and "effects 6 -- the Court has signaled that the reasonableness of privacy
expectations in such areas is contingent upon the existence of "effective"
barriers to intrusion. In other words, one's constitutional privacy is limited
by one's actual privacy.63
That stance ineluctably leads to the conclusion that Fourth Amendment
protection varies depending on the extent to which one can afford
accoutrements of wealth such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy
curtains, and vision- and sound-proof doors and walls." Although the
Supreme Court itself has yet to hear.a case directly on point, lower courts
have not been reticent about following up on this implication of the Court's
decisions. As a result, people who live in public spaces (for instance, the
homeless who reside in boxes) and people who have difficulty hiding or
distancing their living space from casual observers (for instance, those who
live in tenements and other crowded areas) are much more likely to
experience unregulated government intrusions.6"
a search). Lower courts have held that viewing the interior of a home from that part of the
curtilage that invites the public (e.g., a sidewalk) is not a search. See WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.3(c) (3d ed. 1996).
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, paper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. ").
63. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding that officer who saw
marijuana in backyard from helicopter did not engage in search because "[a]ny member of the
public could legally have been flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400
feet and could have observed Riley's greenhouse. The police officer did no more."); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (finding no search when officers saw marijuana in backyard
from airplane because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed"). The Court's recent decision in Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), although emphasizing the sanctity of the home in holding that use of
a thermal imager to detect heat sources within a house is a search, unfortunately restates the
proposition that home surveillance that does not involve "intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area" is not a search. Id. at 34. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Peeping TechnoToms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393, 1406-11 (2002) (arguing that Kyllo leaves intact the inquiry
into whether sufficient steps to protect privacy have been taken).
64. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observationsand Proposalson the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 529, 541-42, 542 nn. 94-95 (1978) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment privacy exists only for "those wealthy enough to live exclusively in private places").
65. With respect to homes in public areas, see, e.g., People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610,
613 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (no privacy expectation in cardboard box located on city sidewalk
in which homeless defendant was residing); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 154 (Conn. 1991)
(no privacy interest in home under a bridge); State v. Cleator, 857 P.2d 306,308 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993) (no privacy expectation in tent pitched on public land without permission). But see State
v. Dias, 609 P.2d 637,640 (Haw. 1980) (holding that people who had lived in makeshift homes
on public land for a long period without government interference have expectation of privacy).
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Even in those situations where the interior of the home is not viewable
from a public space, the homes of poor people are more likely to receive
little or no Fourth Amendment protection. The most blatant example of
this tendency is Wyman v. James,66in which the Supreme Court held that
welfare workers may conduct warrantless, suspicionless inspections of
benefit recipients' homes for the purpose of detecting welfare fraud.67 Five
members of the six-member majority in Wyman went so far as to say that
such inspections are not searches at all,6 while the sixth concluded that,
even if such inspections are searches, they are reasonable because the
evidence so obtained could not result in criminal sanction.69
Yet a mere four years earlier, in a case involving inspection of a home
outside the welfare context, the Court had expressly rejected the latter line
of reasoning (and thereby implicitly rejected the non-search rationale as
well). In Camarav. Muncipal Court,'° the Court considered whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to residential health and safety inspections for
faulty wiring, leaky pipes, and the like. 7' These inspections, like welfare
inquiries, normally result only in a civil penalty if violations are found. 72
Yet the Court held that health and safety inspections, if conducted
nonconsensually, do require a warrant, albeit one that can be based on
generalized rather than individualized suspicion. 73 Furthermore, the Court
was only willing to relax the warrant requirement to this extent because of
the public's general "acceptance" of such inspections, their lesser
invasiveness, and the difficulty of detecting health and safety violations in
other ways. 7'4 None of these assumptions are as easily made in the welfare
inspection context, where relevant information can be gleaned in a number
75
of ways other than traipsing through the home without a warrant.

With respect to viewing of tenements and the like, see, e.g., United States V.Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273,

1280 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no search where police look into back door that is "readily accessible
from a public place, like the driveway and parking area here"); State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277
(Me. 1988) (no search where officer on path from side door looked into basement window);
LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 486 ("[Clouns are inclined to view those occupying [multipleoccupancy] dwellings as having a reduced privacy expectation.").
66. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
67. Id. at 326.
68. Id. at 318.
69. Id. at 326 (White, J., concurring).
70. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

71. Id.
at 525.
72. Id. at 531.
73. Id. at 538-40. The term "generalized suspicion" is mine. Slobogin, supra note 54, at 82-

83.
74. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
75. For instance, in Wyman itself the record showed that federal regulations regarding
investigation of welfare fraud required neither a home visit nor an interview with the recipient's
children, Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319, that James offered to provide the state any information it
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Wyman and Camaraare hard to reconcile, except on the ground that the
homes of people on welfare get less Fourth Amendment protection.
Admittedly, there is a line of cases, decided subsequent to Wyman and
Camara,which stands for the proposition that licenses to engage in certain
businesses may be conditioned on relaxed Fourth Amendment protection. 6
From these cases one might argue that welfare benefits can likewise be
conditioned on relinquishment ofFourth Amendment rights in one's home.
But homes are not businesses; they are clearly entitled to greater privacy."
More importantly, the Court has specifically refused to permit warrantless
entries even of businesses when the government is after assets for tax
purposes.78 Presumably, therefore, the Court would require a warrant when
the IRS seeks evidence of tax-related illegalities (whether in a business or
residence) even though tax breaks, like welfare benefits, are a form of
government largesse that could be conditioned on relinquishment of Fourth
Amendment rights. Those suspected of tax fraud get full Fourth
Amendment protection; those suspected of welfare fraud get none. Once
again, the poor person's Fourth Amendment rights pale against the
wealthier person's.
There are other, more subtle, indications in the Court's caselaw that the
homes and belongings ofpoorer folk receive lesser constitutional protection
from government searches. For example, adjoining apartments may be
searched even when only one of them is listed in the warrant, so long as the
"objective" facts make distinguishing between the two difficult," something
that would never happen with two freestanding houses or even most welldesigned (i.e., more expensive) apartments."' Along the same lines,

at 314, and that the state already knew her child had a skull fracture,
desired in an interview, id.
a dent in the head, and a possible rat bite. d at 322 n.9.
76. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981) (upholding a warrantless,
suspicionless inspection of a coal mine because coal mining is a "pervasively regulated" industry);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (upholding a warrantless, suspicionless
inspection of a gun store on the ground that "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection").
77. LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 531 ("It is a fair generalization ... that business and
commercial premises are not as private as residential premises, and that consequently there are
various police investigative procedures which may be directed at such premises without the police
conduct constituting a Fourth Amendment search.").
78. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,359 (1977) (holding that a warrant,
based on probable cause, is required before agents from the IRS may enter business premises to
seize assets to satisfy tax assessments).
79. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987).
80. Indeed, it is hard to believe that objective facts could justify search of two different
apartments. As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent in Garrison,it is "difficult to imagine that,
in the initial security sweep, a reasonable officer would not have discerned that two apartments
were on the third floor. .

. ."

dissenting).
Id. at 101 (Blackmun, J.,
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vehicles, in which less well-offpeople are much more likely to live, may be
searched without a warrant." When that holding was based on the idea that
cars might disappear before a warrant could be obtained, 2 it at least had a
presumptively neutral justification. Now, however, the rule is bottomed
solely on the Court's assumption that a mobile vehicle-regardless of
whether it is likely to move before a warrant can be obtained and regardless
of whether it is a home-is associated with a lesser expectation of privacy
than a house."
Consider two other possible examples of a poverty exception in the
search context. Justice Scalia has asserted, probably accurately, that under
the Court's "containerjurisprudence" any container outside a building can
be subject to warrantless search," again a scenario more likely to affect
those who have no building in which to place their belongings. Finally, the
Court has held that, while consent to search a car clearly permits police to
search a brown paper bag on the car floor,85 "[i]t is very likely
unreasonable" to believe that the same consent would authorize search of
a locked briefcase in the trunk," dictum that speaks for itself.
B. Seizure Jurisprudence
Examples of a Fourth Amendment poverty exception also abound in
connection with seizures. For instance, a public arrest need not be
authorized by a warrant. v As is true of the vehicle exception described
above, this rule would not be inequitable if limited to those situations in
which police have no time to obtain a warrant. But the Court does not
require exigency for an arrest made in public." As a result, the police
virtually never need a warrant to arrest either a homeless person or a person

81. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) (holding that police may search a

"vehicle" in any setting that "objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for
transportation," and concluding that the search of the mobile home in this case did not require a
warrant).
82. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925), was the case that established the
"automobile exception" but, unlike Carney,471 U.S. at 386, it focused on the mobility of the car
rather than the privacy interest associated with it.
83. See supra note 38; see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938,940 (1996) (rejecting
a lower court holding requiring "exigency" in order to justify a warrantless automobile search).
The Court's migration from an exigency to a privacy rationale for the automobile exception is
recounted in WHrTEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supranote 38, § 7.02.
84. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 585 (1991) (Scalia, ., concurring).
85. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,251 (1991).
86. Id. at 25-52.
87. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976).
88. Id. ("[W]e decline to transform [a] judicial preference [for arrest warrants] into a
constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to
authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause.").
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who spends most of his time outdoors because his home is crowded, in a
state of disrepair, or simply unpleasant. In contrast, the person with a good
home is generally protected from warrantless arrest in non-exigent
circumstances.
Consider also the Court's suspect holding that brief police-citizen
encounters on the street and on public transportation are "consensual," 9
despite the fact that such encounters are often tense even when the citizen
is innocent." That holding is much more likely to affect the poor, who
spend relatively more of their time on the street. Similarly, living in a high
crime (poor) neighborhood, while not sufficient in itself to give police
reasonable suspicion to stop individuals, 9 can authorize detention on
relatively little else, such as when the person runs from the police,' despite
the fact that many poor people, especially African-American ones in certain
urban areas, do not want to deal with the police even when innocent of any
crime.93

Finally, there is Lago Vista v. Atwater," perhaps not an obvious
example of the poverty exception, but worth at least considering from that
perspective. There, over a vigorous dissent by four justices, 9 the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent custodial arrest even for
"very minor crimes." Police will use this authority primarily to arrest three
types of people for minor offenses: (1) traffic violators who are from out89. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (holding that brief questioning
on abus is not a seizure); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that chasing
a fleeing individual is not a "seizure"); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (holding that
"brief questioning" not involving physical restraint is not a seizure).
90. Daniel J.Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment ConsensualEncounter Doctrine, 38 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 507, 521 (2001) ("The doctrine of consensual encounters, as established by the
Supreme Court and administered by the lower courts, is by and large a fictional construct,
exempting from the coverage of the Fourth Amendment significant interferences with personal
liberty.").
91. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (individual's presence in a high crime
area, "standing alone," is insufficient for reasonable suspicion).
92. Id. at 124-25.
93. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[R]esidents in this
[African-American] neighborhood tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and
violent."). The Bayless scenario is a possible example of an "African-American exception" to the
Fourth Amendment. But as with the cases purporting to endorse a Mexican exception, it is weak
evidence of such an exception, even if one accepts that many innocent African-Americans run from
the police. Reasonable suspicion only requires a modicum of suspicion, and running from police,
independent of the runner's race, more often than not is evidence of guilt. On the other hand, the
same cannot be said of living in a poor, high-crime neighborhood. See generally Slobogin, supra
note 54, at 80 n.262.
94. 532U.S.318(2001).
dissenting).
95. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J.,
96. Id. at 354.
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of-state and may need to be taken into custody to ensure their fines are
paid; (2) those who "misbehave" when confronted by the police (apparently
the category into which Ms. Atwater, a middle-class "soccer mom," fits97);
and (3) those whom the police simply want to harass or check out, despite

the absence of any concrete suspicion. The last (and by far the largest)
category of arrests will occur because, given the Court's search incident to
arrest jurisprudence, 98 police may conduct a search of a person and the

interior of the person's car if they can come up with a valid ground for
custodial arrest. What type of people are police most likely to stop for
trivial criminal violations in the hopes of carrying out such warrantless and
suspicionless searches? I leave it for the reader to decide.
V. CONCLUSION

Relative wealth makes a difference in search and seizure. Atwater and
a few of my other illustrations may be contestable as solid evidence of a
poverty exception to the Fourth Amendment. But compared, for instance,
to the evidence for an exception aimed at Mexicans, there are fairly robust
indications that the Court's caselaw affords the poorer people in our
country much less protection of their privacy and autonomy than those who
are better off.
If there is a "poverty exception," why does it exist? One might try for
a deep critique, and suggest that the Founding Fathers were primarily
interested in protecting middle class property values over all else.99 More
prosaically, perhaps the members of the Supreme Court presided over by
Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, from which virtually all of these cases
come, cannot imagine their own privacy being invaded by street cops,
welfare workers, or traffic police using minor violations pretextually;
consciously or unconsciously, their decisions may reflect that fact. Most
directly, a Court interested in crime control might want Fourth Amendment
rules that make it relatively easy to search and seize the class of people
most likely to commit crime-the poor.
I am willing to believe that the poverty exception is not an intentional
creation of the Court. Certainly, seemingly "neutral" reasons can be given
for all the decisions described in this Essay. But neutral reasons also can be
given for the contrary result in each instance. Perhaps had the Court
97. Although neither Ms. Atwater nor her child were wearing a seatbelt, there was evidence
that the officer who stopped her had a previous unpleasant encounter with her that might have
influenced his actions. Id. at 324 n. 1.
98. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that a custodial arrest of
a car occupant permits search of the interior of the car); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
236 (1973) (holding that a custodial arrest authorizes search of the arrestee's person).
99. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 100-01 (1962 ed.).
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thought more carefully about the interests of the poorer segments of society
when deciding its cases, it would have structured a Fourth Amendment that
is more protective of us all.
POSTSCRIPT: POVERTY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
ACCORDING TO PROFESSOR STUNTZ
After completing this Essay, I was reminded of Professor William
Stuntz' thought-provoking 1999 article "The Distribution of Fourth
Amendment Privacy."' ° On the surface, that article and this Essay are
similar in perspective, for Stuntz too argues that the Fourth Amendment
needs revision given its differential impact on those who are poor.
However, both his description of the Fourth Amendment's discriminatory
effects and his prescription for how to deal with them are quite different
than mine. Fleshing out these points helps fmetune the theme of this Essay.
Stuntz makes three basic assertions. His first claim-and the one most
closely related to the argument in this Essay-is that Fourth Amendment
law, in particular its emphasis on privacy, raises the cost of investigating
middle- and upper-class crime relative to crime committed by the urban
poor.'' Because the latter group is more likely to engage in crime in less
"private" places, such as the streets and cars, it is less likely to receive
Fourth Amendment protection. 2 Building on that premise, his second
assertion is that, contrary to my position, we ought to relax Fourth
Amendment standards to the extent they are based on privacy, as a means
of lowering the cost of investigating the more well-to-do. 3 His third
assertion is that this step might, in turn, increase the presence of wealthier
people in prisons, thereby exerting pressure to change our currently harsh
approach to punishment, which may exist, in part, because those with
political clout do not experience it.'

Crucial to all three assertions is the assumption that Fourth Amendment
law itself is a primary cause of differential law enforcement. I agree with
that conclusion to a point. As I have already demonstrated, currentFourth
100. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of FourthAmendment Privacy,67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265 (1999).
101. Id. at 1267.
102. Id. (concluding that "[pirivacy, as Fourth Amendment law defines it, is something
people tend to have a lot of only when they also have a lot of other things").
103. Id. at 1289 ("[Lless constitutional regulation might not be a bad thing, given that
constitutional regulation does not seem to be advancing the cause of fairer, and more fairly
distributed, policing.").
104. Id. at 1287 ("[Ilf the pool of criminal defendants had been wealthier and white.., it
seems plausible to suppose that the politics of crime and punishment would look different
today."). Professor Stuntz develops this point further in William J.Stuntz, Race, ClassandDrugs,
98 COLuM. L. REv. 1795, 1840-41 (1998).
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Amendment law defines expectations of privacy and consensual encounters
so narrowly that only those people who can afford opaque living quarters
and crime-free neighborhoods are likely to avoid random or near-random
government confrontation.
But Stuntz is after bigger and different game than the specific rules I
have criticized. He is dissatisfied with any Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to the extent it relies on varying the degree to which the
government must justify its actions on the degree to which privacy is
invaded. Even reforming the law in the way that I advocate would make
house searches more difficult to justify than car searches, car searches
harder to uphold than frisk "searches," and home arrests more burdensome
than stops of both cars and pedestrians.0'° Stuntz argues against this
proportionality approach because of its disproportionate impact on the
poor.
The descriptive problem with this argument is that a proportionalitydriven Fourth Amendment approach does not have the impact Stuntz says
it has. The police undoubtedly are fixated on the urban poor. But the
greater willingness of the police to investigate this group is the product of
a number of factors having nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment.
Police investigative behavior is most strongly influenced by the simple fact

that the urban poor commit more violent crime and at least as much drug
crime as other groups in society.'" Furthermore, classism and racism,
citywide and community-based political pressure, and the relative ease of
policing known "crime areas" all conspire to make the disadvantaged citydweller a relatively attractive police target.'0 7
If Stuntz is correct that the Fourth Amendment is one of the real culprits
in explaining differential police treatment, one would expect to see very few
searches of houses belonging to the urban poor, because such searches,
requiring a warrant and probable cause, are inefficient in a poor
105. For further elaboration of my views on Fourth Amendment doctrine (which explicitly
call for a hierarchy of Fourth Amendment protections), see Slobogin, supra note 54, and
Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Callfor Rejuvenation of the Proportionality
Principle,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1053 (1998).
106. Following Stuntz, supra note 100, at 1272-73, 1 equate the urban poor in this context
with young Black males. As David Cole notes, "[aill relevant data-from arrest rates to conviction
rates to victim reporting-suggest that young people are more likely to commit crime than old
people, men more likely than women, and black people more likely than white people." DAVID
COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIuMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21-22
(1999). Stuntz himself quotes data indicating that Blacks and Hispanics use drugs at least as often
as Whites in proportion to their representation in the population. See Stuntz, supra note 100, at
1286 n.77.
107. See Carol S.Steiker, "How Much Justice Can You Afford"-A Response to Stuntz, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1290, 1291-92 (1999) (detailing reasons why it would be "difficult ...to
imagine that law enforcement policy would change even if Fourth Amendment law were altered
so as to decrease the relative cost of policing the rich").
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neighborhood where police can easily resort to street stops and frisks. Yet
the evidence we have suggests that relatively more house searches occur in
inner city neighborhoods than anywhere else.' The police are not picking
on the urban poor because the rest of society is too hard to search; they are
simply going after the group they think, rightly or wrongly, is most
crimogenic, in whatever fashion available to them, including searches of
houses. The same attitudes that explain the driving-while-Black
phenomenon, which involves disproportionate stops of Black and Hispanicdriven cars on highways driven by people of all classes and races 9 also
explain police treatment of inner city poor. The Fourth Amendment's
hierarchical focus on privacy plays little or no role in facilitating this
differential treatment.
But let us assume I am wrong about this. That gets us to the
prescriptive part ofthe analysis. One would think that, if Stuntz is right that
Fourth Amendment rules provide a significant incentive for police to focus
on the poor, the solution would be to provide more Fourth Amendment
protection to that group, rather than reducing it for the rest of society.
Stuntz argues, however, that the latter move is not possible. He rightly
points out that, at least as the Court defines it, expectations of privacy and
autonomy vis-A-vis the government are governed largely by expectations of
privacy and autonomy vis-i-vis others,"' and that, under this standard,
108. The only evidence I could find on this point comes from the famous National Center for
State Courts study. RICHARD VAN DutzEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEmONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES (1985). That study involved seven cities, three of
which (Harbor, Hill and River) had populations which were approximately 60% Black and
Hispanic, and the other four of which (Border, Forest, Mountain and Plains) were approximately
thirty percent or less Black and Hispanic. Id. at 5 (Table I). A later study of the same cities
reported crimes rates, populations, and number of warrants issued in these same seven cities for
the year 1984. Craig Uchida et al., Acting in Good Faith: The Effects of United States v. Leon on
the Police and Courts, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 473 (1988) (Table I, on characteristics of cities) &
487 (Table 3, on warrant-based caseflow). Based on this information (and simplifying it), Harbor
City and Border City had similar populations (around I million) and crime rates (Harbor City
averaged 80 crimes/1000 to Border City's 70 crimes/1000), yet Harbor City, with a minority
population three times greater than Border City's (20%), issued well over twice as many warrants
(368 to 135). Hill City and Forest City also had similar populations (around 500,000) and crime
rates (Hill City averaged 115 crimes/1000 to Forest City's 110 crimes/1000), yet Hill City, with
a minority population three times greater than Forest City's (20%), issued more warrants (125 to
109). River City and Plains City had similar populations (around 750,000) and similar warrant
issuance numbers (119 to 113). Although River City had twice the minority population that Plains
City did (60% to 30%), Plains City's crime rate was somewhat higher (100/1000 compared to
80/1000), a fact that should lead to more warrants, not fewer, if all else is held equal.
109. See generally David A. Harris, "DrivingWhile Black" andAll Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 561-66
(1997) (describing statistics in several jurisdictions indicating that Black and Hispanic drivers are
stopped much more often than whites relative to their presence on the highways).
110. See supra note 63; see also Stuntz, supra note 100, at 1268-69 (describing cases that
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activities in public, and brief encounters with others, will always be seen as
less intrusive than house searches and arrests.
If we are willing to reject the Court's current mode of analysis,
however, we can still provide the poor more meaningful Fourth
Amendment protection without abandoning a proportionality-driven Fourth

Amendment. As many have argued,"' the Court is wrong in linking the
scope of Fourth Amendment privacy to our everyday privacy. Especially in
this age of easy technological surveillance, the latter barely exists. Instead,
based either on a privacy notion or a mutual government-citizen trust
rationale," 2 the poor's homes should be accorded the same constitutional
protection as the mansions of the wealthy; the poor's belongings, even
those in paper bags, should be treated in the same fashion as the contents
of a briefcase; and street stops should be recognized as the nonconsensual
encounters they are (as the few well-to-do people who have experienced
them recognize. 3 ).
Stuntz' dislike for the privacy basis of the Fourth Amendment does not
lead him to abandon all regulation of police search and seizure, of course.
Rather, he suggests that because of our obsession with privacy we have not
paid enough attention to the coercive aspects of police investigative
techniques." 4 For example, he notes, a coercion-based approach to the
Fourth Amendment might be more successful than current rules at

"take the privacy people have, and use it to define the privacy that the police cannot invade
without some good cause."); id. at 1284 (describing caselaw as holding that police-citizen
"encounters are generally deemed consensual if the officer refrains from physical force and puts
his commands in the form of questions").
111. See, e.g., Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1597 (1987) (arguing, in the Fourth Amendment standing
context, that "the threat to our interests comes not from other individuals, but from the
government").
112. See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust

Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1763, 1777 (1994) (arguing that the
privacy focus of the Fourth Amendment should be supplanted with a focus on mutual
"government-citizen trust" so as to avoid a Fourth Amendment based on a "factor that, over the
long term, resulted in an overall decline in the Amendment's protections"). I have argued that
Sundby's trust model is problematic as a framework for devising specific rules governing search
and seizure, but that it makes good sense as a metaphor for describing why government power
should be limited even when we lack privacy vis-fi-vis others. Slobogin, supra note 105, at 1060.
113. See account of ex-professional baseball player Joe Morgan's encounter with the police,
in Victor Merina, Joe Morgan's Suit ProtestsDrug 'Profile,' L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1990, at B I
(discussing Morgan's federal civil rights lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles for illegal racial
profiling at Los Angeles International Airport).
114. Stuntz, supra note 100, at 1289 ("Perhaps it is time to think about search and seizure
cases not in terms of the strength of different defendants' privacy interests, but in terms of the
kinds of interests that matter most to the kinds of suspects police target most... police coercion
and harassment ... ").
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inhibiting random stops and searches at "street markets," in which many of
the poor conduct their drug business."'
He is probably right. But a properly constructed privacy-based approach
that recognizes the nonconsensual nature of such stops would have the
same inhibitory effect on police behavior.' 6 In any event, recasting the issue
in terms of coercion will not avoid the hierarchical effects Stuntz seeks to
prevent: because home arrests and searches are more coercive than street
stops and frisks, his regime will still disproportionately affect poor people.
Moreover, reliance on coercion as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis leaves huge loopholes in the regulatory regime. For instance,
because surveillance using technology such as wiretaps, video cameras,
beepers, magnification devices, and x-rays can often be conducted
coercion-free,"" it would be subject to little or no regulation under Stuntz'
approach, with a consequent vast potential for "expensive" mistakes against
rich and poor alike.
Where Stuntz is closest to the target is in his third assertion that
sentencing policy would change ifwe put more well-to-do people in prison.
American sentencing rules, which are among the world's harshest," 8
probably would become fairer if we put a greater number of such people
behind bars. Stuntz is willing to restructure Fourth Amendment law
radically to achieve that goal.
There is no doubt that if we relaxed restrictions on search and seizure,
more people, including more upper class people, would end up in prison.
Consider a number of other moves we could make in the same vein.
Suspects could be denied counsel during interrogation, regardless of
whether they have one waiting in the wings."" All defendants, rich and
poor, could be required to accept representation by overworked public

115. Although he alludes to this point in his George Washington Law Review article, see id.
at 1284, it is best developed in Stuntz, supra note 104, at 1823-24.
116. See Slobogin, supra note 105, at 1057-58, 1083 (arguing that a "security" model of the
Fourth Amendment that recognizes privacy, autonomy, and property interests should require
reasonable suspicion for short stops and patdowns and probable cause for prolonged stops).
117. For a description of the extent to which technology poses threats to privacy, see
Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar
Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 404-08 (1997) (describing
video surveillance and tracking, magnification, illumination and detection devices).
118. See THE SENTENCING PROjECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
USE OF INCARCERATION 1995 (1997) (The United States incarcerates approximately 600 out of
every 100,000 citizens; the closest Western European country is Spain, which incarcerates 105 out
of every 100,000 citizens.).
119. Cf. Philip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacementfor Miranda, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 303,
308-09 (1986) (recommending elimination of the right to counsel at interrogation); Thomas
Weigend, Germany,in CRimiNAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 187,201 (Craig Bradley ed.,
1999) (noting that Germany provides a right to silence but no right to counsel during police
interrogation).
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defenders.' Defendants could be limited in their spending on experts and
other types of evidence preparation. 2' In short, at every point where wealth
provides an advantage, we could refashion the constitutional rule
(downward) to neutralize that advantage. We could force the O.J.
Simpsons of the world to play by the rules governing most criminal
defendants.
Perhaps, in a very indirect way, that approach would improve the
overall quality of the criminal justice system. The elite might not put up
with a system that treats everyone the way we now treat the poor. If so, by
reducing the constitutional protection all defendants enjoy, in theory we
would actually increase the protection the poor enjoy in fact.
Of course, the other possibility is that, if there was such a downward
ratchet, everyone would lose, rich and poor alike. At least in the Fourth
Amendment context, I am not willing to take that risk. There are other less
constitutionally threatening means of bringing home the costs of our crime
and sentencing policies. 22
' In the meantime, rather than minimizing Fourth
Amendment protection for the better-off, we should eliminate the poverty
exceptions that permeate Fourth Amendment law.

120. Cf Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n ofRadiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,334.35 (1985) (holding
that a congressional statute limiting attorneys' fees in administrative cases involving veterans to
$10 per case did not violate either the due process clause or the First Amendment).
121. Cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that indigent defendants are
entitled to state-paid expert assistance only when the expertise is relevant to a "significant factor"
in the defense, and that even in such cases the defendant is entitled to only one such expert, who
need not be the one the defendant prefers).
122. One method, of course, is equal enforcement of the law, which would not only put more
upper and middle class people in prison but might also, as Stuntz himself has pointed out, improve
social norms toward drug usage. Stuntz, supra note 104, at 1841 ("[M]ore equal enforcement
might strengthen the norm itself, which would do more than prison cells can to combat the social
breakdown that drugs can cause.").
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